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BOOK REVIEW
UNGER, Roberto, Passion, An Essay on Personality,•
New York: MacMillan, 1984, Pp. 330, $14.95 U.S.
RICHARD F.·DEVLIN*

· _,.:_t

Passion is Roberto Unger's methodological, epistemological and
ontological prolegom'enon to a reconstructionist social, political and
legal theory. 'I_'he essay builds upon his earlier critique ofLibernlism 1
by providing the foundations for a theory oriented towards the cre
ation of a society where the "conditions of self assertion" can thrive.
Glimpses of this emancipatory and constructive theory have already
emerged in his Critical Legal Studies article 2 and, us for as we rnn
tell, it is to be further adumbrated in his forthcoming Po litics .:1
Passion is a cogently structured, compel Jingly argued and seduc
tively enthralling masterpiece which, in years to come, will undoubt
edly stand out as an inspirational source for many who seek social
transformation. Unger's style, in this essay at least, is lucid ancJ
inviting. Substantively, Passion demonstrates not only the depth of
his penetrating intellect but also his command of an array of' disci
plines. Unger's polymathy is all the more impressive when we remem
ber that ours is an era in which idiosyncratic specialization is the
norm.
The treatise is divided into three distinct sections: a methodologi
cal introduction; a prescriptive theory of human identity based on
*LL.B. Queen's University, Belfast; LL.M. Queen's University, Kingston.
1 Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 19751. Law in Modem Society !New
York: Free Press, 1976).
2 "The Critical Legal Studies Movement"< 19831, 96 Harv a rd Law Review 561.
3 At least one caveat is apposite. Professor Unger nppea,rs to be repenting his
technique of producing two closely interconnected works, one essentially philosoph
ical, the other more concrete and "practical". Each is a reinforcement of the other.
There is therefore a danger of too hastily reviewing the present contribution and
thereby failing to do Professor Unger justice. However, I believe this book to be of
such radically inspirational importance that no time should be wasted in opening
up the debate so that the foundations can be laid for the, perhaps more important,
companion volume which promises us "a comprehensive theory of society and social
transformation".
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the passions; and an appendix which advocates the practical appli
cation of his theory in the field of psychiatry. Unger's aim is to
reconceive and reactivate the "ancient and universal practice of
imputing normative force to images of man" (vii), by advocating a
modernist reconstruction of the Christian-Romantic tradition via
the technique of a speculative treatise on human nature.
Unger presents us with a sophisticated, four stage methodological
introduction in which he rejects a plethora of, what he perceives to
be, stagnant traditions. His primary opponent is Positivism, "that
distinction between normative and factual claims that constitutes
the starting point of most modern moral and political philosophy"
( 40 l. He argues that the dichotomy of "is" and "ought", fact and
value, is based upon the natural sciences and that, although this
may be appropriate for them, it is (!unacceptable'' and "irrelevant"
to other philosophical inquiries. Three arguments are offered in
support of his position: firstly, that the results of positivistic approaches
have been consistently disappointing, vacuous and contradictory;
secondly, that they covertly invoke a substantive image of human
nature - ·one that supports their own vis1on of "the good"; and
thirdly, that the dichotomy has proved to be ultimately conservative
in the attempt to improve the condition of man and society.
This critique raises at least one fundamental problem. Although
this reviewer would agree with Unger that Positivism is inappropri
ate to all forms of philosophy, it would also appear that he has failed
to make his argument strongly enough. This second criticism is
pertinent; however, the first and third criticisms are only valid if we
are prepared to accept Unger's (or some other radical's) assumptions
and interpretations as being correct. Consequently, if we are ulti
mately unconvinced by Unger's own argument in Passion then, at
best, he has only left us with the Weberian dilemma of gods and
demons and not a compelling refutation of Positivism. 4
Furthermore, the critique of Positivism brings to light a problem
atic that runs throughout the essay - what might be called U'nger's
'footnoteless; style. He neither uses the word "positivism", nor does
he explicitly refer to any positivist theorists. Rather, in a few pages,
with a broad sweep of the pen, he delineates a tradition and offers an
incisive critique. More generally, on a careful reading, one can sense
debates with, and criticisms of Kuhn, Sartre, Beckett, T.S. Elliot,
Nietzsche, Heidigger, Gadamer, Rawls and others. This is worn· 4 For a stronger critique of Positivism see Jurgen Habermas, ''The Analytical Theory
of Science and Dialectics" and "A Positivistically Bisected Rationalism" in T.W.
Adorno et al. The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. (London: Heinemann,
1976l and Knowledge and Human Interests <Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).
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some since it leaves the reader unsure of who or what she might
have missed. Furthermore, the approach may give Unger an unfair
advantage in that his argument becomes all the more convincing
only because of the relative ignorance of the reader. On the other
hand, this technique demonstrates Unger's capacity to synthesize
and portray the quintessential features of a tradition. It also has the
advantage of inviting the reader to take Unger at his word and to
enter into a personal discourse with him. To be fully conscious of all
the debates may r_esult in the reader pigeon-holing the other theo
rists and thereby bringing even more of her own prejudices into
play. On balance, although it makes the reader uncomfortable, the
technique renders a not insubstantial contribution to the power of
Unger's argument.
Having disposed of Positivism, Unger can proceed to the second
stage of his argument- that-a different approach must be adopted.
Rather than rejecting a normative position in toto, as Positivism
demanded, we should instead attempt to alter the standard (Arist.olk:in
metaphysical) version from within by submitting it to a thorough
going criticism and revision. This allows Unger Lo outline and criti
cise internally several traditional views ofhuman nature und Lhen!hy
lay the foundations for his own thesis: the integrntion of' thvnod- _
�rnist ��pt of "cont�-�ll!�.U�!J1".:•.Yith .tb-�..Chxi?ti�!lJtq!]},,� IJJ!S.,::'.L�-�..
of_ f0.�D.d!E� em.P..h..�j�09.'�!lj,�rity�;_-�
... According to Unger, two central themes pervade the ChristianRomantic tradition's approach to personality: the firsl is the pri
macy of personal encounter with love as its redemptive moment; the
second is an iconoclastic attitude towards any particular social order.
Love and iconoclasm are inextricably linked - the world must be
changed, contexts and hierarchies must be broken, so that man's
condition may be more fully open to love. 5
The key then of modernism is its rejection of naturalistic, absolut
ist contexts and its awareness of"contextualism"." On Unger's inter
pretation modernism argues that:

5 It is important lo notice that Unger believes that this tradition is not bound lo its
Christian roots; for him il is as secular as it is religious and thnt to accept il, we do
not have to be Christians or even theists.
6 Contextual ism is the belief that all activity is ordinarily shnpcd by instilulional or
imaginative assumptions; that contexts are contingent in that they can be sur
passed; and, that conditionality itself can never be overcome.
It should also be pointed out that although Unger rejects naturalism, he is also
cautious lo distance himself from the behaviouralism of B.F. Skinner or the some
times Marxist view of man as the concatenation of determinative social and
economic forces.
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.. . the personality makes and discovers itself through its experience of not fitting
into the given settings of its existence and through its failure even to escape
entirely from cognitive and emotional isolation.7

Significantly, it also maintains that every social system represents
"an unnecessary and unjustifiable constraint on the possibilities of
social life and individual existence". 8 Modernism's triumph is it
realization of "plasticity", its sceptical attitude towards received�
conceptions of personality and society, and its pursuit of uceaseless
social recombination". 9
Unger argues that the modernist contextualist view of personal
ity must be seen as 11a moment in the transformation of the Christian
Romantic interpretation of human nature"; 10 that the former is
continuous with and complementary to, the latter. Firstly, in both
the Christian-Romantic doctrine of personal encounter and the mod
ernist emphasis on self-assertion, primacy is given to intersubjectiv
ity rather than the search for impersonal (materialist) reality or
good. Secondly, both traditions emphasize context transcending since
no institutional order or imaginative vision can ever fully exhaust
the types of practical or passionate human connections. In brief,
they are both open traditions. It is the fusion of these traditions with '
their advocacy of solidarity, self-assertion, contextualism and open J
ness that Unger wishes to. develop in his substantive theory of the
passions .
In the final stage of his introduction he makes more explicit the
normative status of his argument. Having rejected both transcen
dentalism and Positivism, he portrays his approach as an "existen
tial project", that is, as a theory of the person that gives a measure of
sense, unity and value to our lives with the consequent belief (hope?)
that we can change our situation in the course of trying to under
stand it. The normative value derives not only from a sort of
consciousness-raising, in the course of which we obtain wisdom as to
how we should change ourselves and our societies, but also from its
capacity to reactivate a belief in the potency of purposive human
action. This argument is designed to avoid, among others, the mod
ernist propensity for relativism, e�treme scepticism and nihilistic
fatalism which Unger perceives to be conservative.
The essay itself is perhaps best read as an inquiry into the nature
of solidarity, its impact upon the person and her intersubjective

l

7 P. 147.
8 P. 35.

9 P. 15.
10 P. 38.
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passionate relations, �:t'nd the normative consequences of these for/
society.
Unger commences his tractate through an investigation of the
essence of human nature. He argues that the q uintessence of the
person is her capacity for self-reflection (consciousness), which has
two aspects - the "self-centered" and the "self-objectifying". For
Unger this schizophrenic awareness is the core of the problem of
solidarity and the dynamic for the life of passions. He then goes on
to develop a three tier "biographical genealogy of the passions" 1 1
which suggests how these two facets might come to co-exist.
Through his fascinating discussion of these stages of self-formation
we become aware of the intersubjective aspect of the problem of
solidarity. The self as a child needs others not only for physical
support but also for affirmation of her identity via "empatheti c
responses". 1 2 However, since. the other is an "other", then that
affirmation must be incomplete, and thus the self gradually becom es
aware of her own limitations and the reality of insa tiability. This
tension is exacerbated by a growing awareness of contingency and
evanescence (death). These propositions allow Unger to ou tline one
of his central theses: the dialectic of mutual longing and mutual
jeopardy, unli mited mutual need and unlimited mutual fear, a crav
ing for self-disclosure and self-surrend er, infinite- seduction and infi
nite terror, love and hate. Unger argues that people need a rndical
acceptance of themselves by others but tha t t his quest is te rr i fying
because people m ust take risks, become vulnerabl e, expose th em 
selves and suffer failure, rejection and hurt. This is t h e pro blem o f
solidarity. There can never by complete reconci liation between mutual
longing and m utual fear,
. . . between the need to susta in and develop a self through i n \'Ol\'eml•nl i n shared
forms of l ife, and the need to avoid the dependence and depersona l i z. i t i on w i th
which all such involvements Lhrealen us. i :i

Professor Unger claims that it is only from this perspective that we
can understand the passions. 1 4 For him, passions operate in the realm
1 1 P. 1 4 7 .
1 2 P. 1 5 2 .
1 3 P. 1 35. A l though I fi n d this argument both stimulati ng and i n t u i l i\'ely a ppeal ing
it is also problematic. Unger claims that the stages of sclf-formalion a re both
analytic and empiri ca l , but it seems to me thal their epistemological status i s
unclear. H e clearly intends them t.o b e more than a neur.i slic device but I a m
unconvinced a s t o their empirical validity. I wonder, for example, about their
relation to Kohlberg's psychological model of ego development. Again, perhaps i f
Unger had cross-referenced I would have been more convinced.
14 Indeed, he explicitly rejects the two traditional and dominant views of passion:
passion as opposed to reason and passion in contrast to social convention.
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of intersubjectivity; they are a n attempt to come to terms with the
utual jeopardy; they are rooted in
problem of m
our most basic strivings: to be someone an o ave a place in the
world; they are non-instrumenta l and non-strategic; they are the
quest for freedom, the attainment o f the conditions of self-assertion.
In accordance with his optim istic normative stance, Unger docs
not stop at this essential ly descriptive point. On the contrary, despite
his poignant awareness of the possibil ity of a fa i led and schizophre
nic l i fe osci l l ating between d iversion and boredom, a hardened and
yet submissive self, he constantly u rges upon us his own ideal, "the
romance o(.Jno.raL.s_uccess'. 1 5 Battl ing aga i nst n i h i l isti c despair
anctforvently p leading for the potential of purposive human activ
i ty, he beseeches us to bel ieve that freedom can only be attained
through "renunciation and loss, risk and endurance, renewal and
reconci l iation". 1 6
The third stage o f Unger's substantive argument i s a n impressive,
indeed seductive, analysis of the passions, both the virtues and the
vices. He begins by i ntroducing the "proto-social passions"1 7 l ust and despai r - and demonstrates how they are i ntegra l ly related
to th e problem of solidarity . But the original ity and appeal of his
argument l i es not in his portrayal of their destructiveness, but in
his belief that in herent i n both lust and despair is an emanci patory,
constructive and radi ca l izing capacity. He proceeds to argue that
hatred, vanity , pride, jea l ously and envy are al so outgrowths of the
dynamic of mutual longing and m u tual jeopardy. Yet none of these
are pure and, l i ke the proto-social passions, within each there is a
capacity for turnaround since they a l l require intersubjective aware
ness. For Unger, inherent in each of the vices there is an i nternal
tens ion through which l ove and reconcil i ation cou ld flourish. It is
importan t to notice that Unger only claims that there is a potential,
not a determ inative or positivistic law - his aim is that by making
us conscious of the l i m i tations of the vices we can become aware of
our own potential and gradually change ourselves and our world .
In contrad istinction to the vices, he outlines the epiphanies of
fa ith, hope and love. His discussion of love, i n which he assiduously
avoids utopianism and sentimentalism, is remarkable in that it evokes
within the reader feelings and desires that have been emasculated
by the vicissitudes of personal experience. Hope and (secular) faith
are portrayed as extensions of love. I mportantly, Unger does not
claim that these virtues w i l l conquer, rather that they are' passions
..
1 5 P. l l l .
1 6 P. l l l .
1 7 P. 1 7 4 .
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which we as h uman beings have, and which have a potential ''to
resolve conflicts which seemed insoluble and break through fron
tiers which seemed impassible". 1 8 He claims that there are lim its
to, and anomalies within, our alienated relations where these vir
tues already exist and could fl ourish if we would only let them. For
Unger the stagnating present is fertile with the empowering future,
but there are no guarantees that the seeds will be sown. 1 9
The appendix i s an address Professor Unger gave t o the American
Psychiatric Association and can be read as a practical application o f
h i s theory.
It is this reviewer's h ope to have made manifest Unger's intri
guing theory of the personality, and his belief in the potential of
progress. However, if this was all that Unger had achieved, then his
work would probably be disregarded by lawyers who would be inclined
to see it as abstract philosophy with little practical relevance. But
Unger cannot be disposed of so easily.
Inextricably linked with his mo ral vision Unger has a political
vision. A t heory of the personality is fundamental to n :;oci,d and
e_o li tical_ �. He argues thaf the virtues are presel1t in ever�
society but th at:
. . . cul t u res and collectivities d i fTer in their hospital i ty lo lhc�l· unruly occur
rences, in t h e i r selection of areas of social l i fe that they recogn ize ;1s ;1ppropri a t e lo
the assertion of fai t h . hope and love, and in their w i l l i ngness to draw poli tical
infl'rences from these revela tory events.'L 0

He clearly believes that modern liberal dcmocralic sociely <locs l i llle
to encourage the virtues. Indeed, he portrays t h e "rich western wor ld"
as "an economy of h atred", as an egotistical, prcjud icia I, possessive
hierarchial and materialist society where distrust, domination a n
dependence fester. Here the extent of altruism is super fi cial senti
mentality and "the cowardly habit of begrudging tolcran ce".'l 1 More
specifi cally, he demonstrates little regard for contemporary legal
institutions. For example, he suggests that our high regard for righ ts
is merely an o utgrowth of our lack of mutual trust. He offers a
scathing critique of"tit-for-tat contractualism" as the basis of social
interaction, advocating against society where continuing coll abora
tion and attitudes are the i mportant factors and not a rigid plan of
· rights and responsibilities.
18 P. 2 2 1 .

1 9 I have spent much less time on this central section because the grandiloquence of
Unger's argument speaks for itself. I have therefore only set out his position i n
skeletal form.

20 P. 247.
21 P. 2 2 1 .
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Unlike some of his Critical Legal Studies colleagues, however,
Unger does not confine himself to the purely negative task of "trash
ing". His avowed aim is noti only subversion �_'3.!:...?..l.$0..se.lf and soci
etal recafisirl1ction�·--consec u-efftly;-rejectTngthe presentl y revered
virtues of moderation and prudence, he advocates two practical motivational factors which wil l enable us to transcend not only our moral
selves but also our political situation - "visionary intelligence"22
and "patient and hopeful availability". 23 The task of the former is to
identify the anomalies and lacunae in the dominating social system
and to realistical ly exploit them in favour of the virtues so that they
may become the distinguishing characteristics of a society. The lat
ter is really an exhortation to be open-minded, enthusiastic and
prepared to make the necessary effort. It asks us to take advantage
of a contextualist world and to be master of it, not dogmatically, but
openly. In essence, it is empowerment itself in the pursuit of freedom.
By going beyond critique and offering these constructive sugges
tions, Unger avoids the fatalistic conservatism of nihilism and fol
lows Marx in advocating that philosophy should be praxis. He wants
to prevent any aspect of the institutional and imaginative order
,.
from gaining effective immunity from challenge, conflict and revision. Thi�_ rejection of "any organizational imperative of society"24
is particul a rly . relevanCwHli.]:fgard"- fo··1aw. �H1s IS not the l i beral
idea that laws· should be open to challenge, reform or repudiation;
rather it is that the very ideal of the Rule of Law itself should be
challengeable if that would be to the advantage of humanity. In
brief, Unger would reject any fetishized view of law. The sugges
tions of his Critical Legal Studies article, 25 ( itself an excellent exam
ple of applied visionary intelligence) with regard to the role that law
can play in the development of a more communitarian society, must
be seen in this light. Unger demonstrates a . willingness to utilize
legal institutions, if possible, but also to go beyond them, if neces
sary.26 His advocacy of a calculated, occasional, incremental and
tentative emancipatory struggle is intended to be all ·the more
subversive in that such techniques dissol ve the line between reform
and revolution.
To elaborate, Unger's work can be interpreted as part of a tradi
tion which is not only broader than the Critical Legal Studies
22 P. 255.
23 P. 259.
24 P. 1 4 .

2 5 Supra note 2.
26 My aim is not to portray Unger as some demonic fiery-eyed revolutionary with an
anti-legal propensity; r�ther it is merely to make explicit the seriousness of
Unger's challenge to western liberal democratic.society.
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movement, but also one that has a more distinguished ancestry.
Scott Warren has described this tradition as "Dialectical Theory"
and has traced its origins to certain works of Kant, Hegel and the
early Marx. 27 It has been developed by, among others, Gramsci,
Lukas, and Merleau-Ponty and is currently espoused to Habermus 28
and Dallmayr. Unger shoul d be added to this intellectual lineage
because of his emphasis on humanity, his enthusiasm for openness,
and his relational style of argumentation.
Most dialectical thought has advocated transcendence, humanity,
community, intersubjectivity, species-being etcetera, but without
adding much substance to these concepts. Unger, on the other hand,
by concentrating on human nature and the passions, has caught
something of what it is to be a conscious, self-reflecting and emo
tional human being. He has therefore gone further than any of his
predecessors or contemporaries by providing these ideals with some
thing more than a mere slogan value. This, perhaps, is his greatest
contribution. Secondly, Unger unreservedly embraces openness. For
him any fixed vision of the good society is anathema since the
undynamic is both dominating and dogmatic. His ideal is fre�d.om )
and empowerment, the capacity to continu a l l y _rema.ke· arid improve
the world:
.
/
The modernist theory of I ceaseless social recombin ation I represents less a view of/
the means towards the achievement of individual and col lective self-assertion '
/
than a thesis about the very meaning of sel f-assertion.w

Thirdly, Unger's style of argumentation is almost perfectly dialecti
ca l ; his emphasis is always upon interaction, inter-relations and
dynamics. Thus, we have dialectics of methodological and substan
tive, fact and value, sel f-centered and self-objectifying, self and
other, self and society, satiation and insatiability, the empathetic
response, solidarity and contextualism, vices and virtues, longing
and jeopardy, Christian-Romantic and modernist, present and future,
legal and moral-political. Unger has escaped the stultifying antino27 The Emergence ofDialectical Theory. Ch. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1984 l.
28 Indeed, i t may be possible to argue that Unger is consciously working parallel to
J urgen Habermas, see, for example, "the discussion focuses upon the emotional
rather than on the practical or the cognitive aspects of /the) problem (or solidarity)
. . . and not the tradition of shared discourse" (22>. Th is is an explicit reference to
three of Habermas' key concepts, 'so perhaps Unger is h inting at a division of
labour. However, on a close reading of both theorists there are intimations of
perhaps fundamental disagreement on certai n points, most i mportantly, lhc nature
of truth and justice.
29 P. 246.
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mies o f Liberalism and discovered the emancipatory capacity of
(!unifying polarities". 30
Ultimately, however, this reviewer is unconvinced by Unger's
argument. The dissatisfaction arises from a flaw in his own dialecti
cal mode of thought. Firstly, it is doubtful if Unger has successfully
distanced love and faith from their Christian roots as the religious
connotations may simply be too strong. This, in turn, raises the
question of his unfailing optimism and faith in human nature. One
fears that he may be asking too much of humanity by seeking in us
the courage to risk vulnerability and to gamble with our deepest
secret fears. His "visionary intelligence" (which demands realism) is
hardly sufficient to modify his unflagging confidence. In his desire
to reverse Gramsci, so that there can be optimism of both the will
and the intellect, Unger may be in danger of mistaking the human
race for a race of philospher-kings.
Specifically, in discussing the relationship of exemplary personal
love and social love he claims that:
. . . no sharp break separates total love between man and woman from love among
friends and ultimately from love within a broader group. 31

This thesis is difficult to accept. Intimacy is fundamentally different
from friendship or solidarity. Love of another demands a continual
battle, a promethean struggle against oneself and one's self
\ centeredness. To demand the same level of commitment and involve\ ment is to place too great a demand upon the capacities of the
\ person. Normatively, one questions whether it is desirable for these
\, boundaries to be breached and intimacy so expanded.
The problem is further complicated by Unger's embracing of the
emancipatory capacity of conflict. Conflict, it seems, often entails
violence and violence, in this writer's experience, usually involves
hatred, that "event in history that most tenaciously predisposes
people to disbelieve i n the possibility of changing the conditions of
longing and jeopardy towards risk and reconstruction". 32 Unger
is certainly correct to claim that good can come out of conflict,
history demonstrates that, but evil emerges from the same source.
Interests are important to people and people will fight to preserve
and protect those interests which they perceive to be integral to the
preservation of their own existence. Hatred and violence may be
endemic in any serious conflict of interests. Unger's problem may be
that he has too great a faith in the emancipatory capacity of ideas
and the potential of positive purposive human activity. Consequently
30 P. 1 1 6.
3 1 P. 222.
32 P. 1 95.
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his sanguinity leads him to underestimate the (negative) dialectic of
interests and ideas.
Yet Unger is no starry-eyed utopian dreamer. He is acutely con
scious of the limitations of his own theory:
I I I may have underestimated the viru lence and versa t i l i ty of our ma levolence or . . .
have exaggerated t h e redemptive power of the transforming v i r t ues_:i:i

Nevertheless, and this is the source of his radically inspirational
power, Unger remains steadfast in his refusal to succumb to the
Scy l la of complacency or the Charybdis of despair.
Though not yet persuaded, I am certainly impressed.

33 P. 248.

